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Reviving Escobedo
Janet Moore ∗
This Symposium Essay reflects on the fifty years that have passed since
the Chicago Eight trial by highlighting a new development in criminal
procedure that has drawn little scholarly attention: Judges are reviving the
right of stationhouse access to defense counsel along lines previously
envisaged in Escobedo v. Illinois. The Essay also offers fresh historical and
theoretical perspective on the need for stationhouse counsel. First, the Essay
draws on a series of events occurring during and after the Chicago Eight
trial to illustrate the interrelationship of violence and silence in criminal
legal systems, the distinctive coerciveness of custodial interrogation for
low-income people and people of color, and the corresponding need for
stationhouse counsel to enforce core criminal procedure rights. Second, the
Essay frames judicial complicity in these phenomena as an exemplar of what
Stuart Scheingold called the “myth of rights.” On one hand, judicial
reneging on rights renders them mythical because relying on their false
promise can be delusional and dangerous. Yet as indicated by new efforts to
reinvigorate stationhouse access to counsel, even weakened rights can retain
enough hermeneutical power to inspire social movements, litigation, and
incremental positive change.
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INTRODUCTION
This Symposium Essay reflects on the half century that has passed
since the Chicago Eight trial by examining judicial complicity in abusive
exercises of government power via doctrines that weaken constitutional
criminal procedure rights. 1 The example discussed here lies at the
intersection of two doctrinal fields. The first limits the right to counsel,
including for people who are subject to custodial interrogation. The
second undermines protections against police use of force. Together,
these doctrines imbue stationhouse interrogation with distinctive coercive
power, particularly for low-income people and people of color. 2
The analysis offers new historical, doctrinal, and theoretical
perspective on that coercion. First, fresh context is provided by
connecting a series of events that occurred during and after the Chicago
Eight trial. This historical sketch illustrates the close relationship of
violence and silence in criminal legal systems, and highlights defense
counsel’s critical law enforcement role during custodial interrogation. By
enforcing rights to be free from police violence, counsel can vindicate
other rights, including rights to silence and to pretrial release, which
affect case investigation, plea bargaining, and sentencing. 3
The Essay’s second major contribution is to highlight recent efforts to
promote stationhouse access to defense counsel. These efforts are
intriguing, but have drawn little scholarly attention. Some interventions
1. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405,
441 (2018); Allegra M. McLeod, Police Violence, Constitutional Complicity, and Another Vantage,
2016 SUP. CT. REV. 157. For a related critique in the field of employment law, see SANDRA F.
SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE
DISCRIMINATION LAW (2017).
2. Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 142 (2017); Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson & Richard A. Leo, The Miranda App: Metaphor and Machine, 97 B.U. L. REV. 935, 937
& n.13 (2017).
3. See infra notes 142–144.
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involve social movements, activist lawyers, and nonprofit policy reform
organizations; in Chicago, such interventions have sparked judicial
rulemaking aimed at securing early access to counsel. Other judges are
interpreting international law and state constitutional provisions to the
same end. All of these efforts are reviving the possibility of systematized
early access that was once envisaged in Escobedo v. Illinois. 4
Escobedo established a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during
custodial interrogation. 5 The case quickly receded from judicial and
scholarly discussion after Miranda v. Arizona 6 recognized a Fifth
Amendment right to stationhouse counsel. Escobedo’s influence declined
further as the Court narrowed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in
the early stages of criminal legal proceedings and discounted the
importance of attorney-client relationships. 7
This Essay argues that the emergence, recession, and reemergence of
protections envisaged in Escobedo exemplifies what Stuart Scheingold
calls the “myth of rights.” 8 As Scheingold explains, judicial reneging on
rights renders them mythical, in that relying on their false promise is
delusional and sometimes dangerous. On the other hand, he argues that
even degraded rights retain meaning and hermeneutical power, which in
turn can inspire social movements, litigation, and incremental change—
as well as corresponding backlash.
The Essay has four Parts. Part I draws on events surrounding the
Chicago Eight trial to illustrate how police violence saturates the context
within which custodial interrogation occurs, particularly for low-income
people and people of color, making the physical presence of stationhouse
counsel a necessary (if partial) antidote. Part II summarizes judicial
diminution of related Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights
governing police use of force and the right to counsel. Part III highlights
lesser-known judicial enhancements of stationhouse access to counsel.
Part IV anticipates and responds to objections for expanding such
initiatives.

4. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
5. Id. at 490–91. A week before deciding Escobedo, the Court incorporated the Fifth
Amendment right to silence against the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in felony cases was incorporated fifteen months earlier. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. See infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text.
8. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE xviii–xix (Univ. of Mich. 2d ed. 2004) (1974).
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I. VIOLENCE AND SILENCE:
FROM THE COURTHOUSE TO THE STATIONHOUSE
“Silence is power.”9
“Keep going until you get answers . . . .” 10
The aphorisms above emerged from efforts of social movements and
legal service providers to strengthen the position of suspects and
defendants in the early phases of criminal legal processes. The
aphorisms’ juxtaposition hints at the complex relationship between
violence and silence in criminal legal systems. This Part analyzes that
relationship by connecting a series of events that occurred during and
after the Chicago Eight trial. The first incident involves the denial of
Bobby Seale’s Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel during that trial.
The second and third incidents involve killings of Black Panther Party for
Self-Defense (BPP) members by police and by other Party members. The
fourth involves efforts to redress decades of torture inflicted by Chicago
police on low-income people and people of color. Scheingold’s myth of
rights pervades these events.11 People silence themselves and others.
They offer, demand, and coerce communication. They invoke, enforce,
evade, interpret, and break the law. Some do so as police, prosecutors,
and defense lawyers; others, as activists, informants, and defendants; still
others, as witnesses, jurors, and judges. Across events and roles, violence
and threats of violence remain a reliable constant.
A. Bobby Seale and the Right to Choose Counsel
The courtroom drawings from the Chicago Eight trial have been
described as “indelible.” 12 Some of these drawings depict the courtordered use of force in silencing Bobby Seale, a cofounder of the BPP.13

9. FIRST DEF. LEGAL AID, https://www.first-defense.org/ (last visited May 28, 2019).
10. “The First 24”—A Participatory Defense Action Tool, ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUST.
PROJECT (Mar. 8, 2016), https://acjusticeproject.org/2016/03/08/the-first-24-a-participatorydefense-action-tool/ [hereinafter COBARRUBIAS, “The First 24”].
11. See generally SCHEINGOLD, supra note 8.
12. BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, THE CHICAGO SEVEN: 1960S RADICALISM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
5 (2008), https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/71/The_Chicago_Seven_-_1960s
_Radicalism_in_the_Federal_Courts.pdf.
13. Id. at 48 (including a court sketch of Bobby Seale by Howard Brodie); Howard Brodie,
[Bobby Seale Attempting to Write Notes on a Legal Pad While Bound and Gagged in the Courtroom
During the Chicago Eight Conspiracy Trial in Chicago, Illinois] / Brodie ‘69 CBS, LIBR.
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/item/2016653405/; Garrett Albert Duncan, Black Panther Party:
American Organization, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/BlackPanther-Party (last visited May 28, 2019).
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In the first of these
images, Seale attempts to
take notes after being
bound and gagged during
his trial on federal riot
and conspiracy charges
in the wake of the 1968
Democratic
National
14
Other
Convention.
images depict Seale’s
being double-gagged and
wrestled
from
the
courtroom
by
U.S.
Photo courtesy of Howard Brodie’s estate
Marshals while still
bound to his chair. 15 The use of force escalated as Seale persisted in
seeking to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel or, in
the alternative, to act pro se in his own defense by arguing motions,
making statements to the jury, and cross examining witnesses. 16
The judge cited Seale’s disruptiveness as justifying three actions. The
first action was using force in an attempt to silence Seale; the second was
the mistrial and severance of his case from the cases of the remaining
Chicago Seven; the third was Seale’s summary imprisonment for more
than four years on contempt charges.17 Among the exchanges that the
judge cited as “most flagrant” in justifying these outcomes, 18 the phrases
“constitutional rights,” “defend myself,” and “not my lawyer” dominate
Seale’s speech. Seale made rarer but increasingly direct connections
between the denial of his rights and racism and fascism on the part of the
judge, prosecutors, and law enforcement. 19 Sometimes he called those

14. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 349 (7th Cir. 1972); RAGSDALE, supra note 12, at 1–
5.
15. Howard Brodie, Seale / Brodie ‘69 CBS, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/
item/2016652876/; Howard Brodie, Marshall [sic] Pressing Hand Against Seale to Shut Him Up
(Caught This Glimpse Through Door to Holding Cell off Court) (Blood on Seale’s Mouth) (Black
Marshall) [sic] / Brodie ‘69, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/item/2016652868/; Chicago
Seven Trial Defendants Indicted in Chicago IL March 20 1969 - Artwork by Howard Brodie in the
Collection of the Library of Congress, ILLUSTRATED COURTROOM (Mar. 19, 2016),
http://illustratedcourtroom.blogspot.com /2016/03/chicago-seven-trial-1969-defendants.html.
16. Seale, 461 F.2d at 350–51, 356–61. For a critical analysis of judicial interpretation of the
right to choose counsel, see Janet Moore, The Antidemocratic Sixth Amendment, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1705 (2016).
17. Seale, 461 F.2d at 374–89.
18. Id. at 374.
19. Id. at 379.
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authority figures pigs. 20
Seale’s approach was consistent with the BPP’s strategy of
simultaneously acknowledging law’s failures, rejecting law’s authority,
and invoking law’s protections. A founding purpose of the Party was to
shield Black people from police violence, through the use of responsive
violence as necessary. 21 Seale and other BPP members expressly invoked
constitutional and other legal rights in justifying their actions. They
framed their activities as appropriate exercises of self-defense doctrines
and the Second Amendment right to bear arms given the failures of due
process, equal protection, and Fourth Amendment protections. One of
Seale’s contempt convictions involved his vociferous articulation of
these principles in the courtroom. 22
On appeal of those contempt convictions, the Seventh Circuit held that
the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a proper hearing on Seale’s
invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel. 23 The panel
found four of the sixteen contempt convictions insufficient as a matter of
law; two of those four dismissals involved references to systemic
racism. 24 The panel vacated the remaining convictions because the trial
judge imposed them summarily, then remanded for a jury trial.
In ordering a jury trial, the panel noted that jurors were better suited
than federal judges to assess “language patterns and word choice [that]
vary greatly between diverse social, ethnic, economic and political
groups,” as well as the fact that “words scarcely used by some persons
may be every-day language to many people who appear in courts.”25 This
judicial nod to the complex relationships among speech, silence,
intersectional identity, and power underscores the many-layered
meanings of both Seale’s invocation of rights and the use of force in
denying those rights. Part II.B explores more of those layers, and their
implications for the exercise of agency by the key actors in the Chicago
Eight courtroom drama.
B. “Deeper Layers to the Story”
Eventually federal prosecutors dropped all charges against Seale.26
20. Id.
21. David J. Garrow, Picking Up the Books: The New Historiography of the Black Panther
Party, 35 REVIEWS AM. HIST. 650, 651 (2007).
22. See Seale, 461 F.2d at 379, 382.
23. Id. at 361.
24. Id. at 371.
25. Id. at 370–73.
26. See Judge Dismisses Riot Charge Against Seale, BG NEWS (Bowling Green State
University, Ohio), Oct. 20, 1970, at 3, https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
referer=https://scholar.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=3506&context=bg-news (incorporating
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However, “there were deeper layers to the story.” 27 Each layer involves
relationships between violence, silence, and criminal legal systems. The
first layer involves the Anti-Riot Act, the federal statute under which the
remaining seven of the Chicago Eight defendants were convicted after
the trial judge severed Seale’s case.
The Act is sometimes called the “H. ‘Rap’ Brown” amendment. It was
added to the 1968 Civil Rights Act to secure passage in the wake of
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination. The Act accommodated demands
from officials who cast Black activists as outside agitators fomenting
unrest and violence. 28 Those demands had deep historical roots in the
enforcement of white supremacy in the United States.29 The Chicago
Eight challenged the Act as an unconstitutional effort to silence dissent.
The Seventh Circuit rejected those arguments, but vacated the Chicago
Seven convictions on other grounds. 30
Yet another layer of the Chicago Eight story involves Seale’s
invocation of his right to choose counsel. The trial judge denied a
continuance motion that would have allowed Seale’s chosen attorney,
Charles R. Garry, to undergo surgery before trial. The judge appointed
activist lawyer William Kunstler in Garry’s place. However, Garry
remained “in constant communication with Seale and advised him to . . .
insist on his right to represent himself” instead of accepting Kunstler’s
appointment. 31 Moreover, according to Garry, he and Seale had
“expected the gagging and shackling long before it happened.” 32 They
deliberately “forced the situation” to highlight Seale’s role as a Black
Associated Press story); Bobby Seale Testifies Quietly for Chicago Seven Defendants, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 6, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/11/06/archives/bobby-seale-testifies-quietly-forchicago-seven-defendants.html (noting dismissal of contempt and conspiracy charges); Seth S.
King, Contempt Convictions Are Upset in Chicago 7 Conspiracy Trial, N.Y. TIMES (May 12,
1972), https://www.nytimes.com/1972/05/12/archives/contempt-convictions-are-upset-in-chicago
-7-conspiracy-trial.html (noting U.S. Attorney’s request for dismissal of conspiracy and riot
charges).
27. Pnina Lahav, Theater in the Courtroom: The Chicago Conspiracy Trial, 16 L. &
LITERATURE 381, 418 (2005).
28. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 104, 82 Stat. 73, 75–77 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2102 (2012)); see also House Passes Bill to Punish Persons Inciting Riots,
CONG. Q. ALMANAC, https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal67-1312869
(last visited May 28, 2019) (discussing local police chiefs’ statements); Robert D. Goldstein,
Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469, 522-524 & n.212 (1989)
(providing historical context).
29. Goldstein, supra note 28, at 474–78, 524 n.212.
30. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 409 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970
(1973).
31. Lahav, supra note 27, at 418 (quoting and citing LARRY SLOMAN, STEAL THIS DREAM 195,
197 (1998)).
32. Id.
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man standing alone against a legal system corrupted by white
supremacy. 33 These facts complicate the interplay of violence and silence
in this federal criminal case. As one commentator noted, “Seale was not
only a victim, but also an active manipulator” of the unfolding drama and
of the judge who was the ostensible director of the action. 34
Additional layers of this story involve the workings of violence and
silence across what historians describe as fluid boundaries between
collective resistance, counter-movements, and criminal activity. 35 One
example involves juror intimidation during the Chicago Eight trial. Early
in the proceedings, the families of two jurors received anonymous notes
at their homes stating that Black Panthers were watching them. The judge
alerted one juror to the note (of which she was previously unaware) and
then, over a defense objection, excused her when she said she could no
longer remain impartial in the face of the implied threat. 36 The second
juror had already seen the note sent to her home, dismissed it as a “hoax,”
and remained on the jury. 37 The judge then sequestered the jury for the
duration of the trial, which took almost five months. 38
Seale denied any Black Panther responsibility for the notes. His codefendants joined him in accusing the government of orchestrating the
notes to bias the jury against them. 39 The federal prosecutors derided
these allegations, and dismissed defense demands for a hearing to
investigate the source of the notes, as “totally frivolous [and] idiotic.” 40
But the defendants’ allegations and demands were not outlandish.
Anonymous, false communication was one of many activities the FBI
used in seeking to “destroy the Black Panther Party” during the
“sophisticated vigilante operation” known as COINTELPRO.41
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Garrow, supra note 21, at 656–61 (detailing historical accounts); Jama Lazerow, Getting
Right with the Panthers, 42 REVIEWS AM. HIST. 162, 166–67 (2014) (same).
36. THE TALES OF HOFFMAN: FROM THE TRIAL OF THE CHICAGO 8/7 18–21 (Mark L. Levine,
George C. McNamee & Daniel Greenberg eds., 1970) [hereinafter TALES].
37. RAGSDALE, supra note 12, at 5; TALES, supra note 36, at 21.
38. Mary Schmich, The Chicago Seven Put Their Fate in Her Hands. One Juror’s Rarely Seen
Trial Journals Reveal How That Changed Her Forever, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17, 2018, 8:40 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/schmich/ct-met-chicago-7-democratic-national
-convention-mary-schmich-20180815-story.html.
39. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 379–80 (7th Cir. 1972); TALES, supra note 36, at 18–
19.
40. TALES, supra note 36, at 19.
41. S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: BOOK III, S. DOC. NO. 94-755, at 3, 185–87 (1976)
[hereinafter CHURCH REPORT] (discussing “COINTELPRO: The FBI’s Covert Action Programs
Against American Citizens”).
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Ironically, vigilantism also shattered the official silence around
COINTELPRO when college professors led a break-in of an FBI office
and sent copies of stolen documents to the press and members of
Congress. 42 Subsequent investigations exposed FBI field directives that
urged agents to generate and implement “imaginative and hard-hitting
counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP.” 43 Agents
responded by seeking to foment violence, to silence the Party and its
members, and to sow distrust and dissension through strategies involving
informants. 44 The latter strategies included embedding informants within
the BPP as well as hanging “snitch jackets” on Party members, that is,
falsely labeling them as informants. 45 As discussed in Part II.C, these
strategies implicate additional layers of the deeply fraught relationship
between violence and silence in criminal legal systems. The next layer
involves homicides of BPP members at the hands of police and other BPP
members.
C. The Hampton and Rackley Cases
1. The Hampton Case
Six weeks after the trial judge ordered Seale bound and gagged in a
Chicago courtroom, Chicago police killed Illinois BPP Chairman Fred
Hampton in his bed during a 4:30 a.m. raid. 46 The raid followed a series
of increasingly violent encounters between Chicago police and local BPP
members. A key player in the raid was William O’Neal, a paid FBI
informant embedded in the local BPP chapter. 47
42. Id. at 3 n.1; Sam Roberts, John Raines, 84, Who Evaded Capture in an F.B.I. Break-in, Dies,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/obituaries/john-raines-84who-evaded-capture-in-an-fbi-break-in-dies.html.
43. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 41, at 22.
44. Id. at 185–223.
45. See id. at 8, 33–34, 46–49 (discussing use of the “snitch jacket” and embedded informant
techniques).
46. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted in part, rev’d
in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (detailing BPP Chairman Fred Hampton’s death in
the 4:30 a.m. raid); U.S. DIST. COURT, N. DIST. OF ILL., E. DIV., REPORT OF THE JANUARY 1970
GRAND JURY 1, 27–28 (1970), https://ia801200.us.archive.org/18/items/Grand-Jury-FredHampton-1970/Hampton.-1970-FGJ-Report.pdf [hereinafter GRAND JURY REPORT] (stating
timing of raid, reporting Hampton’s death, and providing details on police raid personnel and
planning activities); Ron Dorfman, The Fraternal Order of Policemen, CHI. JOURNALISM REV.,
Dec. 1969, at 12 (providing contemporaneous reporting); see also Rosa Hannah, Fred Hampton:
(Apr.
18,
2017),
An
American
Activist,
BLACK POWER AM. MEMORY
http://blackpower.web.unc.edu/2017/04/fred-hampton-american-activist/ (discussing Hampton’s
homicide and citing Fred Hampton, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Fred_Hampton (last
visited May 28, 2019)).
47. See Hampton, 600 F.2d at 617 (stating BPP activities were monitored by O’Neal and stating
that a bonus “was ‘justified’ on the grounds that the raid was based on information furnished by
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Fourteen officers participated in the raid. Their ostensible aim was to
serve a warrant and seize a cache of BPP guns. Seven officers were active
shooters. They used a machine
gun, a sawed-off shotgun, and
other weapons to fire an
estimated ninety-nine rounds
inside the apartment. One bullet
was linked to the BPP occupants.
The barrage killed Hampton and
a second BPP leader, and it
wounded other BPP members
and a police officer. 48
The local prosecutor had
organized
the
raid
in
coordination with the FBI. He
filed attempted murder charges
against the surviving BPP
members. He dismissed those
Photo courtesy of Chicago Sun Times
charges after a federal grand jury
obtained
evidence
that
contradicted officers’ self-defense claims. 49 The grand jury concluded
that the raid was “ill-conceived,” and that subsequent internal police
investigations were “so seriously deficient” as to suggest “purposeful
malfeasance.” 50 A citizens’ commission convened by former U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, NAACP Chairman Roy
Wilkins, and former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark decried the
“wildly excessive” use of force in the raid and the failure of all available
“[s]ystems of justice—federal, state, and local . . . to do their duty to
protect the lives and rights of citizens.” 51
A Cook County judge acquitted the prosecutors and officers of
O'Neal”); CHURCH REPORT, supra note 41, at 223 (“The Bureau and Chicago Police both
maintained paid informants in the BPP . . . used by Chicago police in planning raids against the
Chicago BPP.”); Ron Grossman, Fatal Black Panther Raid in Chicago Set Off Sizable Aftershocks,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 4, 2014, 11:19 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/history/ct-blackpanther-raid-flashback-1207-20141206-story.html (detailing O’Neal’s involvement).
48. See Hampton, 600 F.2d at 605, 612 (“Two of the occupants, Fred Hampton and Mark Clark,
died as a result of the gunfire and four others, Ronald Satchel, Blair Anderson, Brenda Harris, and
Verlina Brewer, were wounded.”); GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 87–88 (detailing the
bullets and shells recovered).
49. Hampton, 600 F.2d at 619–20; GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 114.
50. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 117–23.
51. ROY WILKINS & R AMSEY CLARK, SEARCH AND DESTROY: A REPORT BY THE COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY INTO THE BLACK P ANTHERS AND THE POLICE viii–ix (1973); Arthur J. Goldberg &
Roy Wilkins, The Police vs. the Black Panthers, CRISIS, Jan. 1970, at 23.
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obstruction of justice charges.52 The officers did not face federal criminal
charges because survivors declined to testify before the grand jury. 53
Scheingold’s myth of rights theory offers insight into the grand jury’s
disappointment over not hearing from the survivors. 54 On one hand, the
grand jury attributed that silence to disruptive intent, surmising that
“revolutionary groups simply do not want the legal system to work.”55
At the same time, the grand jury conceded that “the performance of
agencies of law enforcement, in this case at least, gives some reasonable
basis for public doubt of their efficiency or even of their credibility.” 56
Survivor doubts about system efficacy and legitimacy likely grew
during the decade-long litigation of their civil rights suit. The trial alone
took eighteen months, in part because defendants resisted discovery
demands for information on FBI culpability. 57 The relationship between
the trial judge and plaintiffs’ counsel was turbulent and, as in the Chicago
Eight trial, included counsel’s summary convictions and jailing on
contempt charges. 58 After the jury deadlocked, the trial judge granted a
defense motion for a directed verdict based on insufficiency of the
plaintiffs’ evidence. The Seventh Circuit reversed, ordered reassignment
of the case to a different judge, and suggested that the defense should be
sanctioned for obstructing discovery. 59 After more wrangling, the
survivors obtained a $1.8 million settlement, paid in equal parts by the
federal government, Cook County, and the City of Chicago. 60
FBI informant William O’Neal was added as a defendant in the case
after belated defense discovery revealed his role in the raid. 61 Several
years after the case settled, O’Neal committed suicide by running into

52. John Kifner, Judge Acquits Hanrahan of Plot in ‘69 Chicago Raid on Panthers, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 26, 1972), https://www.nytimes.com/1972/10/26/archives/judge-acquits-hanrahan-of-plotin-69-chicago-raid-on-panthers-judge.html.
53. Hampton, 600 F.2d at 620; GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 126 (“The most concise
conclusion is that, in this case, it is impossible to determine if there is probable cause to believe an
individual’s civil rights have been violated without the testimony and cooperation of that person.
This cooperation has been denied to this Grand Jury.”).
54. See generally SCHEINGOLD, supra note 8.
55. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 126.
56. Id.
57. Hampton, 600 F.2d at 639–42.
58. See id. at 644–48 (providing transcripts and analysis of contempt judgments).
59. Id. at 642, 648.
60. See id. at 619–20 (explaining the grand jury proceedings); Joanna L. Brown & Larry Green,
U.S. Agrees to Settle Black Panthers Lawsuit: Survivors of Bloody 1969 Raid by Chicago Police
OK Tentative Accord on $1.85 Million Payment, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1982, at 1, reprint available
at http://jfk.hood.edu/Collection/Weisberg%20Subject%20Index%20Files/F%20Disk/FBI/FBI%
20Chicago%20Field%20Office/Item%2007.pdf (reporting settlement).
61. See Hampton, 600 F.2d at 606 (identifying O’Neal as an additional defendant).
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traffic on the Eisenhower Expressway. 62 After years in a federal witness
protection program, he had returned to Chicago and made several prior
suicide attempts. He expressed regret about his role in Hampton’s death,
but FBI records implicated him in many other strategies aimed at
disrupting and silencing the BPP: Sending false anonymous letters;
“snitch jacketing”; and orchestrating Hampton’s arrest to block a
televised speech. 63
O’Neal also implicated himself in using physical force to extract
information from BPP members. Some of the statements he made before
his death indicate that he may have used methods similar to those applied
in the torture-murder of BPP member Alex Rackley. 64
2. The Rackley Case
Fred Hampton’s killing was “still vivid” the following spring during
pretrial hearings in a Connecticut capital murder case. 65 In that case,
fourteen BPP members were accused of kidnapping, torturing, and killing
Alex Rackley. 66 The case sheds light on the dismissal of Seale’s federal
charges: Authorities likely considered them superfluous because Seale
was among the BPP members facing the death penalty for Rackley’s
murder.
There is no dispute that BPP members tortured and murdered Rackley
because they suspected him of being an informant. 67 These suspicions
arose amidst the confluence of two efforts. The first was Seale’s effort to
strengthen the BPP and its reputation, in part by purging members viewed
as informants or otherwise disloyal or disruptive. The second was the
FBI’s effort to sow suspicion and conflict among BPP members through
informant and “snitch jacket” operations. 68 Amid mounting internal strife
62. Michael Ervin, The Last Hours of William O’Neal, CHI. READER (Jan. 25, 1990),
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/the-last-hours-of-william-oneal/Content?oid=875101.
63. See Hampton, 600 F.2d at 609–10 (detailing O’Neal’s actions as an informant).
64. See JOSHUA BLOOM & WALDO E. MARTIN JR., BLACK AGAINST EMPIRE: THE HISTORY
AND POLITICS OF THE BLACK P ANTHER P ARTY 250–51 (2016); Ervin, supra note 62.
65. Lesley Oelsner, Black Panthers Are Sent Back to Cells After Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES (May 25,
1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/25/archives/deadlock-by-jury-results-in-sealehugginsmistrial-mistrial-declared.html.
66. Id. (reporting details of the case).
67. State v. McLucas, 375 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Conn. 1977) (stating undisputed facts of torture
and shooting); Paul Bass, Black Panther Torture “Trial” Tape Surfaces, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Feb.
21, 2013, 6:42 PM), https://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/rackley_
trial_tape_surfaces/ (discussing taped interrogations); Bruce Weber, Warren Kimbro, Ex-Panther
Who Turned to Life of Service After Killing, Dies at 74, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/nyregion/05kimbro.html (reporting Rackley’s torture and
killing when accused of being an informant).
68. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 41, at 22 (quoting FBI order to propose
counterintelligence measures).

2019]

Reviving Escobedo

113

and distrust, BPP members in New Haven tortured Rackley over the
course of several days, extracted a “confession” that he was working with
law enforcement, drove him to a swamp, and shot him to death. 69
A co-defendant who pled guilty to Rackley’s murder testified that he
acted on Seale’s orders. Other witnesses, including Seale, described
Seale’s presence near the location and time frame in which Rackley was
tortured. 70 Seale denied any involvement, however, and the jury
deadlocked. The judge then dismissed Seale’s charges, ruling that
publicity about the case made it impossible to retry it before an unbiased
jury. 71
The Rackley and Hampton cases further complicate the relationship
between violence and silence in criminal legal systems. Unchecked by
counterbalancing criminal defense or civil rights expertise and untethered
from meaningful judicial oversight, police and prosecutors exacerbated
already deadly risks involving both the forcible extraction of information
from BPP members and their forcible silencing. Those risks were
presented by BPP members and police alike and were risks of which the
FBI had ample reason to be aware.72
In Rackley’s case, BPP members used horrifying violence to force
speech from, and then permanently silence, another Party member. Such
BPP “discipline” aimed to expose and eliminate enemies whose
masquerade as allies required strategic silence about their actual identities
and purpose. The Hampton case illustrates how such masquerades
facilitated horrifying state violence in silencing the BPP. The Hampton
case also illustrates ways in which judges can assist or impede other
government actors in building walls of silence to avoid accountability for
their actions.
The latter theme pervades the next layer of events that have unfolded
since the Chicago Eight trial. This layer involves police abuses so
infamous as to draw condemnation from the United Nations, and to
warrant creation of what may be the only commission in the world
established specifically to investigate and redress government torture. 73
69. McLucas, 375 A.2d at 1016.
70. Lesley Oelsner, Sams Says He Was Calm While Torturing Rackley, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28,
1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/04/28/archives/sams-says-he-was-calm-while-torturingrackley.html.
71. McLucas, 375 A.2d at 1016; Lesley Oelsner, Charges Dropped in the Seale Case;
‘Publicity’ Cited, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/26/archives
/charges-dropped-in-the-seale-case-publicity-cited-judge-finds-it.html.
72. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 41, at 48–49 (discussing risk of death for labeled
informants).
73. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/1–40/99 (2018) (establishing Illinois Torture Inquiry and
Relief Commission); ZACHARY D. KAUFMAN, UNITED STATES LAW AND POLICY ON
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D. Torture on the South Side
Although research indicates that Chicago police had a century-long
history of using torture during custodial interrogation, the violence
discussed in this subpart began in 1972—the same year that a Chicago
judge acquitted the prosecutor and police of wrongdoing for the raid that
killed Fred Hampton. 74 For the next twenty years, in police stations on
Chicago’s South and West sides,
Chicago Police Commander Jon Burge
and his “midnight crew” of officers, all
of whom were white, coerced
information from over 120 men, almost
all of whom were Black, through
physical and mental torture that included
beatings,
burnings,
threatened
executions, suffocation, and electric
shocks with a hand-cranked generator
Photo courtesy of Windy City Times
that Burge called “the n****r box.” 75
Officials ignored and covered up
evidence of this systematic abuse. Judges denied (and affirmed the
denials of) motions to suppress false confessions and for other forms of
relief. 76 Other government leaders withheld internal investigative reports
that corroborated allegations of abuse. 77 Victims were wrongfully

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND PRAGMATICS 28–29 (2016) (using Illinois’s
Commission as an example of a “truth commission”); Kim D. Chanbonpin, Truth Stories:
Credibility Determinations at the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission, 45 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 1085, 1088 (2014) (discussing formation of the Commission to address police torture).
74. See ELIZABETH DALE, ROBERT NIXON AND POLICE TORTURE IN CHICAGO, 1871–1971 1
(2016). As Professor Dale explains, the history of police torture inflicted disproportionately on poor
people and people of color in Chicago began at least a hundred years before the incidents discussed
in this subpart. Id. at 2–27, 102–20.
75. Gretchen Rachel Hammond, Reparations: The Long Battle for Police Torture
Survivors, WINDY CITY TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/lgbt/
REPARATIONS-The-long-battle-for-police-torture-survivors/51850.html. See also Andrew S.
Baer, Dignity Restoration and the Chicago Police Torture Reparations Ordinance, 92 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 769, 770 (2017) (“Race played a critical role in the Burge scandal. Nearly all of the dozens
of detectives involved were white; virtually all of the alleged victims were black.” (footnote
omitted)); Andrea J. Ritchie & Joey L. Mogul, In the Shadows of the War on Terror: Persistent
Police Brutality and Abuse of People of Color in the United States, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 175,
184–89 (2008) (detailing racially motivated torture techniques used between 1972 and 1991); G.
Flint Taylor, The Long Path to Reparations for the Survivors of Chicago Police Torture, 11 NW.
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 330, 330 (2016).
76. See, e.g., In re Claim of Gerald Reed, TIRC Claim No. 2011.030-R, at 3 (Ill. Torture Inq.
& Relief Comm’n Mar. 19, 2014), https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/tirc/Documents/REED%
20amended%20determination%20without%20markup.pdf.
77. Id. at 2.
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convicted and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment and death.78
Attempts to recover damages through civil lawsuits repeatedly failed. 79
After years of victim efforts, community organizing, and activist
lawyering that framed the problem as an international human rights
catastrophe, the walls of silence began to collapse.80 The state legislature
created the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission. 81 The
Commission is approving cases for judicial review despite concerns
about high procedural barriers to relief, the Commission’s limited
authority, and inadequate resources. 82 By early 2019, Illinois had the
second highest number of exonerations (296) among the fifty states,
following only Texas. 83 Nearly 80 percent (235) of the Illinois
exoneration cases were from Cook County. 84 Thus, more wrongful
convictions have been detected and corrected in this single county than
in the entire state of California. 85 In 2017 alone, Cook County was
78. See, e.g., Rob Warden, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, Aaron
Patterson: A Tortured Path to Death Row, NW. PRITZKER SCH. L., http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/il/aaron-patterson.html (last visited May 28,
2019).
79. Taylor, supra note 75, at 332–33; Jon Burge and Chicago’s Legacy of Police Torture, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 19, 2018, 12:22 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-jon-burge-chicagopolice-torture-timeline-20180919-htmlstory.html.
80. See Aretina R. Hamilton & Kenneth Foote, Police Torture in Chicago: Theorizing Violence
and Social Justice in a Racialized City, 108 ANNALS AM. ASS’N GEOGRAPHERS 399, 403 (2018)
(“Wilson’s case is important not only because he won but because the information that surfaced
between 1986 and 1996 (including anonymous tips coming from within the police department) led
to the exposure of Burge and his colleagues.”); Taylor, supra note 75, at 330 (“This scandal . . .
was slowly uncovered and exposed primarily by lawyers from the People's Law Office (PLO), an
investigative reporter from the Chicago Reader, and an anonymous police source . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)).
81. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/1–40/99 (2018).
82. Chanbonpin, supra note 73, at 1104–05; TIRC Decisions, ILL. TORTURE INQUIRY & RELIEF
COMMISSION, https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/tirc/Pages/TIRCDecision.aspx (documenting ninetysix cases decided as of May 28, 2019).
83. See Detailed View of State Exonerations Filtered by State, NAT’L REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={faf
6eddb-5a68-4f8f-8a52-2c61f5bf9ea7}&SortField=ST&SortDir=Asc (last visited May 28, 2019).
84. Compare Detailed View of State Exonerations in Illinois, NAT’L REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={faf
6eddb-5a68-4f8f-8a52-2c61f5bf9ea7}&SortField=County_x0020_of_x0020_Crime&SortDir=
Asc&FilterField1=ST&FilterValue1=IL (displaying 295 exonerations for Illinois through May
2019), with Detailed View of State Exonerations in Cook County, NAT’L REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={faf
6eddb-5a68-4f8f-8a52-2c61f5bf9ea7}&SortField=County_x0020_of_x0020_Crime&SortDir=
Asc&FilterField1=ST&FilterValue1=IL&FilterField2=County_x0020_of_x0020_Crime&FilterV
alue2=Cook (showing 235 exonerations in Cook County. Thus, as of May 28, 2019, 79 percent
(235/296) of the exonerations in Illinois originated in Cook County).
85. Compare Detailed View of State Exonerations in Cook County, supra note 84 (showing 235
exonerations in Cook County), with Detailed View of State Exonerations in California, NAT’L
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responsible for almost half of the nation’s 29 exonerations attributed to
false confessions. 86 By the end of 2018, settlement payments to victims
of Burge and his midnight crew had reached $132 million, and the City
had budgeted another $5.5 million for additional reparations. 87
Despite these developments, there is reason for circumspection about
the possibility of sustainable reform. Empirical evidence shows that
institutional cultures in criminal legal systems are recalcitrant in the face
of reform efforts. 88 Thus, it is no surprise that Chicago’s policing
problem was bigger than Burge. 89 For example, by 2017, Chicago Police
Detective Reynaldo Guevara had matched Burge’s grim record for
“securing the most convictions that later resulted in exonerations based
on coerced confessions” through tactics that often involved physical
abuse. 90 A separate police extortion racket plagued one of Chicago’s lowincome neighborhoods for years and led to another sixty-three
convictions being vacated, with many more cases under investigation. 91
In addition, a 2017 report by the Department of Justice identified
training and internal investigation failures that created a pattern or
practice in the use of force by Chicago police and “deeply eroded
community trust.” 92 That report responded in part to the killing of Laquan
REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?
View={faf6eddb-5a68-4f8f-8a52-2c61f5bf9ea7}&SortField=County_x0020_of_x0020_Crime&
SortDir=Asc&FilterField1=ST&FilterValue1=CA (showing 194 exonerations in California as of
May 28, 2019).
86. See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2017 7 (2018),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/documents/exonerationsin2017.pdf [hereinafter
NAT’L REGISTRY 2017 EXONERATIONS] (“Just under half of these cases (13/29) occurred in Cook
County . . . .”).
87. Baer, supra note 75, at 771 (describing costs and identifying $5.5 million budgeted for
additional reparations); Elvia Malagon, 4 Things: The Cost of Jon Burge’s Police Torture Legacy,
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 21, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ctmet-four-things-jon-burge-torture-chicago-police-20180921-story.html (stating $132 million
cost).
88. See ROBERT E. WORDEN & SARAH J. MCLEAN, MIRAGE OF POLICE REFORM: PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE AND POLICE LEGITIMACY 29 (2017); see generally Jon B. Gould & Kenneth Sebastian
Leon, A Culture that Is Hard to Defend: Extralegal Factors in Federal Death Penalty Cases, 107
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2017) (discussing difficulties with reforming criminal legal
systems).
89. See Chanbonpin, supra note 73, at 1089 (debunking “bad apples” myth).
90. NAT’L REGISTRY 2017 EXONERATIONS, supra note 86, at 7.
91. Christine Hauser, ‘A Stain on the City’: 63 People’s Convictions Tossed in Chicago
Police Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/us/chicagoexonerations-drug-sentences.html.
92. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Announces
Findings of Investigation into Chicago Police Department (Jan. 13, 2017) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta, head of Civil Rights
Division), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-findings-investigationchicago-police-department.
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McDonald, but reflected a history extending to the Hampton case and
beyond. 93 McDonald, a seventeen-year-old Black youth, was carrying a
knife but moving away from police when Officer Jason Van Dyke shot
him sixteen times. As in Hampton’s case, officer justifications for the
killing were contradicted by evidence that authorities sought to keep from
the public. 94
In the wake of these events, the Illinois Attorney General sued the City
of Chicago to address police-related federal civil rights violations. The
parties negotiated a reform-oriented consent agreement that awaits
judicial approval as of this writing. 95 The consent agreement might be
seen as a harbinger of change, 96 as might Van Dyke’s convictions for
McDonald’s assault and murder, the prosecution of other officers for
filing false reports in that case, 97 and Burge’s conviction for obstructing
justice during litigation over his own violence. 98
On the other hand, Trump-era restrictions on DOJ initiation and
oversight of police reform agreements, 99 and the same administration’s
explicit repudiation of the locally-crafted Chicago consent decree,100
93. See DALE, supra note 74, at 1–27, 102–20.
94. Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation, Preseizure
Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 631–35, 634 n.11.
95. Consent Decree, Illinois v. City of Chicago, 912 F.3d 979 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 17-cv-6260),
http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Illinois-v.-Chicago-FinalConsent-Decree-with-signatures.pdf; see also Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260, 2018
WL 3920816 (E.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2018), aff’d, 2019 WL 74366 (7th Cir. 2019) (describing case
history); Chicago Police Consent Decree, ILL. ATT’Y GEN., http://chicagopoliceconsent
decree.org/consent-decree-and-input/ (last visited May 28, 2019) (describing submission of decree
for judicial approval).
96. See generally Louise Westmarland & Michael Rowe, Police Ethics and Integrity: Can a
New Code Overturn the Blue Code?, 28 POLICING & SOC’Y 854 (2018) (discussing the potential
for improvement in police behavior through a new police code). But see WORDEN & MCLEAN,
supra note 88 (discussing recalcitrance of institutional cultures in criminal legal systems in the face
of reform efforts).
97. Megan Crepeau, Christy Gutowski & Jason Meisner, Trial over Alleged Police Cover-Up
of Laquan McDonald’s Shooting Closes with Rhetorical Fireworks, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 6,
2018, 9:30 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-laquan-mcdonaldshooting-police-coverup-20181206-story.html.
98. Jeremy Gorner, Former Chicago Police Cmdr. Jon Burge Released from Home
Confinement, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 13, 2015, 2:45 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-jonburge-police-torture-released-20150213-story.html.
99. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. on Principles and Procedures for Civil Consent
Decrees and Settlement Agreements with State and Local Governmental Entities to Heads of Civil
Litigating Components United States Attorneys (Nov. 7, 2018); Katie Benner, Sessions, in LastMinute Act, Sharply Limits Use of Consent Decrees to Curb Police Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/us/politics/sessions-limits-consent-decrees.html.
100. United States’ Statement of Interest Opposing Proposed Consent Decree, Illinois v. City
of Chicago, 912 F.3d 979 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 17-cv-6260), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1100631/download; Aamer Madhani, Sessions: Chicago Police Consent Decree Plan
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evidence the latest instance of backlash in the long struggle to recalibrate
relationships between violence and silence in criminal legal systems. The
administration’s regressive policies reinforce structural problems that
allow patterns of violence and abuse to occur, that is, the sociocultural,
spatial, and racialized power distributions that promote silence about,
submission to, and stability of extant hierarchies. 101
Scheingold’s myth of rights framework accounts for these powerful
forms of resistance to change, and highlights a salient cautionary tale
from outside of Chicago. 102 During negotiations on the city-state consent
decree, Chicago reformers pointed to Cincinnati’s Collaborative
Agreement (CA) as an exemplar for reducing police violence and
promoting better police-community relationships. 103 The CA settled
lawsuits involving abuses that included numerous killings of unarmed
Black men by Cincinnati police. Early years of CA implementation under
DOJ monitoring led to significant improvements in police hiring,
training, and supervision as well as increased mutual accountability
between police and community. 104
However, backlash was also brewing. The City and the police union
were parties to the CA, but a recent report by independent monitors states
that the City has “unilaterally withdrawn” and is no longer engaged in the
CA’s signature commitment to community problem solving policing.105
The police union also boycotted an attempt to “refresh” the collaborative
process.106 Some Cincinnati officers, like those in Chicago, raise
concerns that scrutiny of their conduct encourages false abuse
accusations, chills law enforcement, and encourages crime. 107 The
‘Colossal Mistake’ Pushed By Lame-Duck Mayor, USA TODAY (Oct. 19, 2018, 3:32 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/10/19/jeff-sessions-chicago-police-departmenthomicide-consent-decree-rahm-emanuel/1694719002/.
101. See Hamilton & Foote, supra note 80, at 404–08 (citing variables that lead to racialized
power distribution).
102. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 8.
103. Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (No.
C-1-99-3170), https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/ccia/assets/File/Collaborative%20Agreemnet.pdf;
WORDEN & MCLEAN, supra note 88, at 181–92; Wyatt Cenac’s Problem Areas: Teacher Problems,
Burial Problems, Collaborative Problems (HBO television broadcast June 15, 2018); Curtis Black,
On Police Reform Deal with Feds, Chicago Can Learn from Cincinnati, CHI. REP. (June 8, 2017),
https://www.chicagoreporter.com/on-police-reform-deal-with-feds-chicago-can-learn-fromcincinnati/.
104. WORDEN & MCLEAN, supra note 88, at 181–92.
105. SAUL A. GREEN ET AL., PROGRESS REPORT: CITY OF CINCINNATI COLLABORATIVE
AGREEMENT: THE STATUS OF COMMUNITY PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING STRATEGY 1 (2018),
https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/assets/File/Community%20Problem-Oriented%20
Policing%20-%20Progress%20Report%20-%20Saul%20Green%20et%20al%201-04-18.pdf.
106. Id. at 17.
107. See Cameron Knight, 1998 Was the Least Deadly Year in Cincinnati. What Can We Learn
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County prosecutor responded to such concerns by obtaining an injunction
that eviscerated a core CA function. The injunction blocks the Citizen’s
Complaint Authority from interviewing police officers who are potential
witnesses in criminal cases—including key witnesses in cases involving
allegations of excessive use of force. 108
If further evidence of institutional and individual resistance to reform
were necessary, it is available in testimony from a Chicago police officer
who appeared as a prosecution witness in the Lacquan McDonald murder
case. The officer testified to being “blackballed” by fellow officers as “a
rat, a snitch and a traitor” 109 after contradicting fellow officers’ version
of events. The officer testified to moving from a patrol position to a desk
job because the situation had become “a safety issue . . . . If I am on the
street, I am on a call, I wouldn’t know who to trust or if anybody would
come to help me.” 110
This testimony underscores the myth-of-rights theme that permeates
this Part’s historical sketch. Activists responded to law’s failures by
invoking other law, by rejecting law’s authority, and by engaging in
violent criminal conduct. Fierce government backlash likewise invoked
the rule of law and broke it, including through violent crime. Informants
and suspected informants navigated fluid and dangerous boundaries;
cause lawyers worked both sides of the impasse; judges enabled and
impeded efforts to build walls of silence around evidence of extralegal
official violence.
In the end, a police officer who provided incriminating evidence
against fellow officers distrusts them and fears that they create risks to
personal safety. The arc of this brief and concededly episodic history
demonstrates that such distrust and fear are even more well-founded for
From It?, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Dec. 20, 2018, 9:27 AM), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/
news/crime/crime-andandandcourtsand-courts/2018/12/20/homicide-rates-1998-safe-cincinnatiwhat-can-we-learn/2052912002/ (discussing statements of Cincinnati police union president Dan
Hils); see also Kristine Phillips, Dozens Claim a Chicago Detective Beat Them into Confessions.
A Pattern of Abuse Or a Pattern of Lies?, WASH. POST (June 9, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/06/09/dozens-claim-a-chicagodetective-beat-them-into-confessions-a-pattern-of-abuse-or-a-pattern-of-lies/?utm_term=.
0f3fd902a7dd (describing rebuttals to accusations of abuse against the Chicago Police
Department).
108. Cameron Knight, Ruling: Citizens Complaint Authority Cannot Interview Officers During
Criminal Cases, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (July 19, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/
story/news/crime/crime-and-courts/2018/07/19/ruling-complaint-authority-cannot-interviewofficers-during-criminal-cases/801629002/.
109. Christy Gutowski, Jason Meisner & Stacy St. Clair, 5 Takeaways from the Second Day of
Testimony at the Trial of 3 Chicago Cops in Alleged Cover-Up of Laquan McDonald Shooting,
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 28, 2018, 9:15 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquanmcdonald/ctmet-laquan-mcdonald-shooting-police-coverup-20181128-story.html.
110. Id.
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people who are subject to custodial interrogation. Part II explains how
judges have contributed to these problems by crafting legal doctrines that
undermine enforcement of key constitutional criminal procedure rights,
including the right to be free from police violence and the right of
stationhouse access to counsel.
II. JUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS ON STATIONHOUSE ACCESS TO COUNSEL
More than fifty years after Bobby Seale cofounded the Black Panther
Party for Self Defense, 111 there is broad acknowledgment of the Fourth
Amendment’s continued inability to prevent police violence and that such
violence disproportionately harms low-income people and people of
color. An example of this acknowledgment is Justice Sotomayor’s
dissenting opinion in Utah v. Strieff. 112 The opinion warns readers that
“your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your
rights.”113
The opinion is a bit misleading, however, in stating that courts
“excuse” Fourth Amendment violations. Courts rarely find violations to
excuse. Consent requirements are so low that courts consider “nearly
everyone” free to leave a police stop or decline permission to search.114
Another aspect of this “constitutional complicity” 115 is judicial deference
to officer perceptions that their conduct was reasonable—a deference that
enables discriminatory stops and seizures, invasive searches, and
racialized police violence. 116
Although words are inadequate to capture the full implications of the
Court’s rulings, 117 this Part focuses on one systemic impact: Weak
enforcement of Fourth Amendment protections against the use of force
by police exacerbates weak right-to-counsel guarantees under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments. The combination imbues custodial interrogation
111. Garrow, supra note 21, at 651.
112. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2070–71.
114. Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 509, 511 (2015).
115. McLeod, supra note 1.
116. Akbar, supra note 1, at 441. See also Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, 103 VA. L. REV.
211, 224 (2017) (describing standard as “subjective objectivity” (quoting Geoffrey P. Alpert &
William C. Smith, How Reasonable Is the Reasonable Man?: Police and Excessive Force, 85 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481, 486 (1994))).
117. See, e.g., Chao Xiong & Brandon Stahl, Video: ‘I Don’t Want You to Get Shooted,’
Daughter Pleads to Mother Moments After Castile Shooting, STARTRIBUNE (June 22, 2017,
5:56 AM), http://www.startribune.com/video-i-don-t-want-you-to-get-shooted-daughter-pleadsto-mother-moments-after-castile-shooting/429948923/ (conveying the reaction of a four-year-old
witness to the police killing of Philando Castile, as she and her mother were confined in the back
of a police cruiser).
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with a coerciveness for which the presence of defense counsel is a
necessary amelioration. The discussion below summarizes Supreme
Court case law that restricts stationhouse access to counsel.
As might be predicted from Scheingold’s myth of rights framework
and the historical sketch offered in Part I, the Court has made numerous
attempts “to civilize police interrogation in America.”118 In 1897, in
Bram v. United States, the Court vacated a murder conviction and death
sentence under the Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled selfincrimination because the investigating detective stripped Bram naked
and confronted him with incriminating evidence from a purported
eyewitness.119 Those acts, the Court held, violated the requirement that
incriminating statements must be “free and voluntary: that is, must not be
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight.” 120 The Court reasoned that the
detective’s actions would have led Bram to believe that he had to respond
out of fear that silence would be construed as guilt. 121
It took nearly seventy years for the Court to incorporate Bram’s Fifth
Amendment protections against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause.122 During those decades, the Court was confronted
with an increasingly politicized international embarrassment: lynching,
and courtroom processes that constituted little more than judiciallysanctioned lynching, mainly of Black people in the south. 123 In a series
of cases, the Court held that such tainted proceedings violated due
process.
First, in Moore v. Dempsey, the Court reversed the denial of a habeas
corpus petition filed by five of six Black men who presented abundant
evidence that their murder convictions and death sentences were the
result of “mob” pressure.124 In fact, that pressure was neither spontaneous
nor unruly. It was the result of systematic, well-organized, violent white
opposition to Black tenant farmers and sharecroppers, who sought to
unionize and had “hire[d] white lawyers to sue planters for peonage
practices.” 125
118. Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda’s Fourfold Failure, 97 B.U. L. REV. 849, 849 (2017).
119. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 539, 542–43 (1897). The purported eyewitness made
the accusation after he was accused of committing the three ax murders. Id. at 536–37.
120. See id. at 542–43 (quoting 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL R USSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS 478 (6th ed. 1896)).
121. Id. at 542–43, 562–635.
122. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
123. See Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You: Participatory
Defense and the Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1291–96 (2015).
124. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87–88 (1923).
125. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
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Next, in Powell v. Alabama, the Court crafted a due process right to
counsel in capital cases after the Communist Party and the NAACP
battled to control the litigation and save the young men known as “the
Scottsboro boys” (the Communists won). 126 Finally, in Brown v.
Mississippi, the Court ruled that the Due Process Clause barred the
admission into evidence of incriminating statements extracted from
Black tenant farmers regarding the murder of a white landowner. 127 The
circumstances presaged contemporary police torture tactics documented
in Part I.D. Statements were obtained “in the exact form and contents as
desired by the mob” of law enforcement-led whites, who inflicted
whipping, mock lynching, and other violence so extreme that the lower
court descriptions seem “more like pages torn from some medieval
account.” 128
About thirty years after deciding Brown, the Court turned to the Sixth
Amendment as a tool for regulating police interrogations. In Escobedo v.
Illinois, the Court held that the right to “Assistance of Counsel” is denied
when a law enforcement investigation
has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken
into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute
constitutional right to remain silent.129

Thus, in Escobedo the Court recognized that, even in the absence of
formal charges, being detained and questioned by police as the prime
suspect in a criminal case poses distinctive risks, the navigation of which
requires the guidance of counsel. 130 The Court specifically
acknowledged the detained individual’s need “to be advised by his lawyer

THE STRUGGLE FOR R ACIAL EQUALITY 98 (2004). Originally, twelve Black men were sentenced to
death for the killing of whites in the ensuing violence; all were released within two years of the
Court’s remand order in Moore. J. S. Waterman & E. E. Overton, The Aftermath of Moore v.
Dempsey, 18 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 117, 118–19, 122–26 (1933). Notably, the first federal judge to
consider the petition granted it, but then recused himself due to “his long years of residence in
Phillips County.” Id. at 121–22. A substitute judge from Oklahoma then denied the writ. Id.
126. See Moore, Sandys, & Jayadev, supra note 16, at 1291–93 (discussing history of Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
127. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 282, 287 (1936).
128. Id. at 281–82.
129. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964). A week before deciding Escobedo, the
Court had incorporated the Fifth Amendment right to silence against the states. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). The Court had incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel against
the states fifteen months earlier. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
130. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488, 490–91.
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of his privilege against self-incrimination.” 131 The Court also identified
pre-indictment interrogation as a critical phase of the proceedings, that is,
a phase when the presence of counsel is required, like post-indictment
interrogation, arraignment, and preliminary hearings. 132
Judge Goldberg wrote Escobedo at a time when social movements
pressured courts to assure the equal and effective exercise of fundamental
rights. 133 On the international stage, Communism was once again a real
and immediate threat. Demonstrating capacities for fairness and equality
in a non-communist system was therefore a high priority.134
Nevertheless, two years after the Court anchored the right of early access
to counsel in the Sixth Amendment, Miranda v. Arizona relegated it to an
ancillary position supporting Fifth Amendment protections against
involuntary self-incrimination. 135
Thereafter, in what one commentator described as “a spectacularly
chaotic farrago of opinions,” the Court imposed increasingly onerous
conditions for invoking those protections. 136 There is broad if not
universal agreement that, as a result of those limitations, “Miranda is
bankrupt both intellectually and in terms of practical effect.”137
Moreover, when the opportunity arose to restore the right of early
attorney access to its Sixth Amendment roots, the Court feinted with a
finely-parsed distinction between “attachment” of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, which does not require the presence of counsel, and
“critical stages,” which do. 138

131. Id. at 488 (emphasis added). A banner headline on Time magazine’s cover described
Escobedo as “moving the Constitution into the Police Station.” TIME (Apr. 29, 1966),
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19660429,00.html [hereinafter TIME COVER] (I thank
Lauryn Gouldin for this reference).
132. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 487–88.
133. ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT 5–
7 (1971).
134. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 3–6, 11–14 (2000); see also BLOOM & MARTIN, supra note 64, at 390–95 (explaining
relationships among the Black Panther Party, its conflict with the United States government, and
Cold War politics).
135. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
136. Alschuler, supra note 118, at 869 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting James J.
Duane, The Extraordinary Trajectory of Griffin v. California: The Aftermath of Playing Fifty Years
of Scrabble with the Fifth Amendment, 3 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 1, 10 n.52 (2015)). For
summaries of those limitations, see Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Miranda and Massiah:
How to Revive the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel as a Tool for Regulating Confession Law, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1085, 1088 (2017), and David Rossman, Resurrecting Miranda’s Right to Counsel, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1129, 1129–30 (2017).
137. Rossman, supra note 136, at 1131; see also Alschuler, supra note 118, at 849–50 (noting
and explaining Miranda’s foreseeable failures).
138. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 198, 212 (2008).
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The Court has also muddied Sixth Amendment right to counsel
doctrine with permissive Fifth Amendment waiver rules, and with
exacting demands for precision, clarity, and consistency in invocations of
the right to counsel. 139 Such decisions detach Sixth Amendment analysis
from its mooring in the attorney-client relationship, as Court rulings
embody “a general apathy towards—if not outright disdain for—the realworld professional value of defense counsel during an interrogation.”140
That disdain encompasses what Escobedo and common sense
acknowledge: The crucial role of counsel in advising a client of all risks
and benefits that could accompany any waiver of rights. 141
These restrictions on stationhouse access to counsel cause significant
harm. They unleash the specter of police violence discussed in Part I.
They increase unnecessary detentions by interfering with pretrial release
advocacy. Those detentions do more than infringe on liberty interests;
they jeopardize jobs, housing, and child custody arrangements.142
Detention also increases pressure to plead guilty, prevents participation
in case investigation and presentation, and causes worse case outcomes
(more convictions, longer sentences, and increased risk of recidivism).143
All of these harms have equal protection implications because they are
avoidable for people who can afford to hire counsel; thus, these doctrines
disproportionately harm low-income people, who are disproportionately
people of color. 144
Restrictions on stationhouse access to counsel also create special risks
for people with other vulnerabilities. Empirical research indicates that,
with regard to rights waivers, “a significant percentage of suspects simply
cannot comprehend the warnings or the rights they are intended to
convey.” 145 One review of Miranda warnings found them to require a
139. Primus, supra note 136, at 1088.
140. Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 381, 386 (2009).
141. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
142. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 (2017).
143. See id. at 715–16 (discussing plea incentives); id. at 736 & tbl. 1 (illustrating and discussing
differences in case outcomes depending on pretrial release status).
144. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: EXPLORING C AUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 56–64, 91–103, 233–58, 303–13
(Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014) (discussing racial and socioeconomic
disparities in U.S. criminal legal systems); Vesla M. Weaver, Jacob S. Hacker & Christopher
Wildeman, Detaining Democracy? Criminal Justice & American Civic Life, 651 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 7 (2014) (same).
145. D. Christopher Dearborn, “You Have the Right to an Attorney,” but Not Right Now:
Combating Miranda’s Failure by Advancing the Point of Attachment Under Article XII of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 359, 374 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519,
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tenth-grade reading level, while the majority of those incarcerated read at
the sixth-grade level or below. 146 These problems are worse for juveniles
and for individuals suffering from mental disabilities or mental illness
because they are particularly vulnerable to giving false confessions.147
As one scholar noted, the resulting miscomprehension of Miranda
warnings is “both literal (not understanding the meaning of the words)
and abstract (not understanding the reasons why one might invoke these
rights).” 148
Unfortunately, police officers are trained to take advantage of these
dynamics. 149 Because those training techniques presume that suspects
will resist, interrogation is “stress-inducing by design—structured to
promote a sense of isolation and increase the anxiety and despair
associated with denial relative to confession.” 150 Again, the data bear out
the distinctive problems that weak right-to-counsel doctrines create for
vulnerable populations. For example, a 2010 study of DNA exonerations
involving false confessions found that 43 percent of false confessors
suffered from some form of mental disability. 151

1563 (2008)).
146. Richard Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings in American Jurisdictions: A
Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 124, 132, 134 (2008).
147. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269 (2011) (discussing vulnerability of juveniles);
see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (same); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
318 n.24, 320–21 (2002) (discussing vulnerability of people with mental disability); Samson J.
Schatz, Note, Interrogated with Intellectual Disabilities: The Risks of False Confession, 70 STAN.
L. REV. 643 (2018) (same).
148. Lauren Rogal, Protecting Persons with Mental Disabilities from Making False
Confessions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a Safeguard, 47 N.M. L. REV. 64, 72 (2017)
(footnotes omitted); see also Virginia G. Cooper & Patricia A. Zapf, Psychiatric Patients’
Comprehension of Miranda Rights, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 390, 398 (2008) (comparing
comprehension of individuals with mental health issues and those without); Naomi E. S. Goldstein
et al., Waving Good-Bye to Waiver: A Developmental Argument Against Youths’ Waiver of Miranda
Rights, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 28–35 (2018) (discussing developmental limitations
among juveniles that impair comprehension); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive
Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1152–54 & tbls. 1–3, 1166 (1980)
(discussing limitations in comprehension, particularly among younger juveniles).
149. See Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30
L. & SOC’Y REV. 259, 266 (1996) (explaining how police interrogators have “refined their skills in
human manipulation”); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449–55 (1966) (discussing
police interrogation tactics).
150. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations,
34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6 (2010).
151. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1064
(2010) (noting that 17 out of the 40 DNA exonerees in the study who falsely confessed had some
form of mental disability); see also Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 971 (2004) (finding that at least 28 of
125 false confessions assessed were provided by individuals with an intellectual development
disorder).
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The risk of the foregoing harms is significant. Research indicates that
the overwhelming majority of people who are subject to custodial
interrogation as criminal suspects waive their Fifth Amendment right to
counsel. 152 Those most likely to waive are those who lack the resources
to hire counsel or sufficient experience with criminal legal systems to
understand the importance of a lawyer’s stationhouse assistance. 153 Thus,
scholars routinely mourn the death of a meaningful right to counsel in
that early stage of the proceedings. 154
An anecdote illustrates how this gap between law’s promise and realworld practice has become hegemonic, that is, so taken for granted as to
be unnoticed. 155 The story returns us to Chicago. In the early winter of
2015, protesters reacted to media coverage indicating that police were
“disappearing” detainees from across the city inside a West Side police
station instead of allowing them access to counsel, family, and friends.156
The hubbub “left many experienced criminal defense and civil rights
attorneys scratching their heads”—not because the allegations were
unfounded, but because the problem was not limited to a single site.157
To the contrary, these attorneys explained, years after the Burge debacle,
incommunicado detention remained system-wide and so ingrained that it
was an everyday practice for police to “routinely play cat-and-mouse
games with detainees and their right to legal representation at district
stations and detective area headquarters all over the city.” 158
Once again, judges have been complicit in enabling such practices. In
the early 2000’s, attorneys for an organization called First Defense Legal
Aid (FDLA) attempted to provide stationhouse representation across
Chicago, but police routinely denied them permission to meet with clients
and witnesses.159 FDLA sued, claiming violations of the attorneys’ First
Amendment rights to associate with clients. The federal district court
agreed and issued an injunction with scathing findings about police
152. Alschuler, supra note 118, at 856 & n.32; Ferguson & Leo, supra note 2, at 947 & n.98.
153. See Alschuler, supra note 118, at 880 (noting that one study showed a vast majority of
defendants who waived their rights had previously been convicted of crimes); Rossman, supra note
136, at 1133 (remarking that modern studies on Miranda rights show that about 80 percent of all
suspects agree to talk without a lawyer).
154. Weisselberg, supra note 145, at 1521.
155. See Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323, 330–31
(2005) (discussing the concept of hegemony).
156. David Heinzmann & Jeremy Gorner, Lawyers Wary of Claim About Chicago Police ‘Black
Site,’ Say Abuse Citywide, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 28, 2015, 7:05 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com
/ct-homan-square-chicago-police-met-20150227-story.html.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. First Def. Legal Aid v. City of Chicago, 225 F. Supp. 2d 870, 872–74 (N.D. Ill. 2002),
rev’d, 319 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 2003).
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conduct in Cook County stations. 160 The Seventh Circuit reversed. The
panel held that there was no right to have police notify clients “that a
lawyer is at the front desk, let alone a right to be escorted inside
immediately and to engage in confidential consultations within the police
station.” 161 Echoing Moran v. Burbine, 162 Judge Easterbrook
emphasized that a “suspect in police custody does not have a
constitutional right to be notified that his attorney is at the
stationhouse.” 163 The opinion reasoned further that interrogation rooms
are not public fora and that, even if they were, attorneys lack First
Amendment-based access to clients in such settings. 164
Responding to such widespread enabling of, and acquiescence in,
restrictions on stationhouse access to counsel, one scholar stated that it is
“not politically feasible to expect any jurisdiction to mandate the
introduction of defense attorneys into the interrogation process without
changing the incentives for attorneys to advise their clients to say
absolutely nothing.” 165 That perspective reflects one aspect of
Scheingold’s myth of rights theory, in which judicial reneging on rights
engenders their downward spiral. Part III offers a glimpse at the other
side of the myth of rights: The continued capacity of even weakened
rights to inspire social movements, litigation, and incremental positive
change—specifically, through interventions that include bans on the
uncounseled waiver of rights.
III. JUDICIAL ENHANCEMENTS OF STATIONHOUSE ACCESS TO COUNSEL
Scholars and advocates have long urged that a ban on uncounseled
waivers is the optimal solution to the diminution of the right to counsel
in the wake of Miranda. They argue that stationhouse access to counsel
is necessary to prevent abuses of power, to ensure that people understand
the consequences of waiving their rights, and to efficiently identify and
resolve other legal issues arising in each case.166 This Part discusses the
adoption of mandatory early-access rules along with other efforts to
promote attorney-client relationships during custodial interrogation.
After surveying rules from a range of jurisdictions, the analysis ends
where it began—in the city of Chicago.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 892.
First Def. Legal Aid v. City of Chicago, 319 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 2003).
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986).
First Def. Legal Aid, 319 F.3d at 967–68.
Id. at 971.
Rossman, supra note 136, at 1137.
See Alschuler, supra note 118, at 875 & n.121 (citing authorities).
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A. Banning Uncounseled Waivers
The ban on uncounseled waivers of rights by detainees is not wholly
foreign to the United States. For example, California requires minors
aged fifteen and under to consult with an attorney before waiving their
right to remain silent or their right to counsel. 167 No request for counsel
is required. Neither the minor nor the minor’s parent can waive the
consultation requirement, and statements made by the minor prior to
consultation are generally inadmissible. 168
Another example is embedded in the legislation that created the Illinois
Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission. The statute requires claimants to
waive their rights to be free from involuntary self-incrimination as a
condition of having their cases heard. 169 Although there is some irony in
requiring waivers from people from whom false confession have been
extracted through torture, the statute creates a right to consult with
counsel before entering the waiver and provides for appointment of
counsel in cases of indigency. 170 Moreover, in a nod to the importance of
attorney advice before entry of any waiver, the statute requires counsel’s
presence “at the signing” of the waiver agreement. 171
A stronger ban on uncounseled waivers is inscribed in Article III of the
Philippine Constitution, 172 but enforcement of that provision seems
unlikely, particularly under the Dutarte administration. 173 However, a
far-reaching ban against uncounseled waivers is being implemented in
the Netherlands. 174 The legislation and accompanying directives
responded to a ruling by the Dutch Supreme Court, which in turn
implemented a ruling from the European Court of Human Rights

167. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 625.6(a) (2017).
168. Id. § 625.6(a), (b).
169. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/40(b) (2018).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. CONST. (1987), art. III, § 12, ¶ 1 (Phil.) (mandating that the right to counsel “cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel”); HECTOR S. DE LEON, TEXTBOOK ON
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION 107–08 (2005), http://anyflip.com/lwff/sjrm.
173. Aurora Almendral, Where 518 Inmates Sleep in Space for 170, and Gangs Hold It
Together, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/07/world/asia/
philippines-manila-jail-overcrowding.html.
174. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right
of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on
the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third
persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, 2013 O.J. (L 2013/48/EU); Wet
van 17 november 2016, Stb. 2016, 475 [hereinafter Implementation Act] (implementing 2013 O.J.
(L 2013/48/EU) in the Netherlands); Wet van 17 november 2016, Stb. 2016, 476 (amending the
Netherlands’s criminal code regarding access to legal counsel); Besluit van 26 januari 2017, Stb.
2017, 29 (establishing rules for police conduct in interrogations).
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requiring early access to counsel. 175
Those rulings imposed a higher burden of proof on prosecutors who
seek to rely on waivers than is imposed under U.S. Supreme Court case
law. The prosecution must present evidence that waivers are the product
either of a defense attorney’s advice on the consequences of waiver or of
independent knowledge that allows people to foresee such
consequences. 176 The Dutch legislation and directives also ban
uncounseled waivers by vulnerable populations, such as juveniles and
people with mental health issues, and by people facing prison sentences
of twelve years or more. 177 Although consultations are limited to thirty
minutes, implementation of these rules has nevertheless been a “turbulent
and radical” change for participants in Dutch criminal legal systems.178
Early evidence on implementation indicates that the shift to provision of
stationhouse counsel has had mixed results.179 Nevertheless, available
data indicate that advice of counsel increases the exercise of rights against
self-incrimination 180 and may be of particular help in addressing the
needs of vulnerable populations. 181
B. Indelible Rights Under Rankin
Another development that has drawn little scholarly attention is the
“indelible” right to counsel secured by the New York State
Constitution. 182 Under this rule, counsel “enters” the case by
communicating with police on the client’s behalf; all police interrogation
thereafter “is prohibited unless [the] defendant thereafter affirmatively

175. Wendy Zeldin, Netherlands: Two New Laws and Decree on Right of Access to a Lawyer,
LIBR. CONGRESS: GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (July 7, 2017), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreignnews/article/netherlands-two-new-laws-and-decree-on-right-of-access-to-a-lawyer/; see also
Charles D. Weisselberg, Exporting and Importing Miranda, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1235, 1251–58, 1264–
81 (2017).
176. Pishchalnikov v. Russia, App. No. 7025/04, 22, ¶ 76 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009).
177. Implementation Act, supra note 174, arts. 28b(1), 28c(2); JODIE BLACKSTOCK ET AL.,
INSIDE POLICE C USTODY: AN EMPIRICAL ACCOUNT OF SUSPECTS’ RIGHTS IN FOUR
JURISDICTIONS 267–68 & n.46 (2014).
178. Paul Mevis & Joost Verbaan, Legal Assistance and Police Interrogation: (Problematic
Aspects of) Dutch Criminal Procedure in Relation to European Union and the Council of Europe,
8 ERASMUS L. REV. 174, 175 (2014).
179. Weisselberg, supra note 175, at 1278–79 (citing BLACKSTOCK ET AL., supra note 177).
180. Willem-Jan Verhoeven, The Complex Relationship Between Interrogation Techniques,
Suspects Changing Their Statement and Legal Assistance: Evidence from a Dutch Sample of Police
Interviews, 28 POLICING & SOC’Y 308, 318–22, 325–28 (2018).
181. See Koen Geijsen et al., The Interrogation of Vulnerable Suspects in the Netherlands: An
Exploratory Study, 9 INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: RES. & PRAC. 34, 46–47 (2018)
(“[V]ulnerability increases the risk of inappropriate interrogation.”).
182. People v. Rankin, 998 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Cty. Ct. 2014).
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waives the right in the presence of the attorney.” 183 The detainee does not
have to request counsel or even know that others have requested counsel
on his or her behalf. 184 Under Rankin, it is also unnecessary for counsel
to obtain a judicial order of appointment if the defendant is indigent.185
The trial court in Rankin reasoned that concerns about disparate impact
forbade the “poignant irony” of restricting the benefit of this
constitutional rule to people who can afford to hire counsel. 186 Similar
rules apply in Oregon, 187 while courts in Illinois, 188 Florida,189 and
Colorado 190 have either not considered the rule’s application to people
who need public defense representation or have imposed more onerous
requirements for establishment of the attorney-client relationship in that
context.
C. Duty Station Counsel
Another early-access approach involves duty station counsel. Three
methods are dominant: “call-in” programs, “visiting” programs, and
“embedded” programs. 191 In call-in programs, a legal aid provider is
contacted to provide legal advice and assistance when a person exercises
his or her right to early access to legal aid. Such programs are emerging
in U.S. jurisdictions ranging from New York City 192 to Seattle.193 In
visiting programs, a legal aid provider regularly calls on a police station
or detention facility to provide legal advice and assistance to detainees.
In embedded programs, a legal aid provider is permanently located at
police stations or other detention facilities so that legal advice and
assistance are available at any time. In a variation on the latter approach,
the Philadelphia Public Defender has embedded social workers for the
183. Id. at 800 (citing People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894 (N.Y. 1976)); see also Adrienne Levy,
Note, Beyond Bing: The Arthur Rule Lives on as the Touchstone for the New York State Right to
Counsel, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 838 (2013) (citing the New York State Constitution).
184. Rankin, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
185. Id. at 583–84.
186. Id. at 584–85.
187. State v. Joslin, 29 P.3d 1112, 1119–20 (Or. 2001) (holding that when a third party “purports
to be speaking for” counsel secured for the detainee, police must cease interrogation or otherwise
convey the legal advice to the detainee, unless officers do not subjectively believe or have an
objectively reasonable basis to disbelieve that the third party is speaking for the lawyer).
188. People v. Woods, 787 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
189. Smith v. State, 699 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1997).
190. People v. Page, 907 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1995), overruled on other grounds sub nom.
People v. Muckle, 107 P.3d 380 (Colo. 2005).
191. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, EARLY ACCESS TO LEGAL AID IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESSES: A HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS AND PRACTITIONERS 70–73 (2014).
192. Interview with Anthony Posada, N.Y. Legal Aid Servs. (Jan. 26, 2018); About Us, GOOD
CALL, https://goodcall.nyc/about-us (last visited May 28, 2019).
193. Interview with Jonathan Rudd, King Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Def. (Jan. 10, 2018).
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sole purpose of pretrial release investigation and advocacy. 194
Some of these processes require law enforcement officers to notify the
defense provider of the detainee’s request for assistance, and some offer
access to counsel without requiring indigency screening. However, as
Hannah Quirk notes, these benefits in the United Kingdom are a doubleedged sword; the detainee’s silence may be used against him or her in
court and counsel may be subject to examination regarding the nature and
content of counsel’s interactions with the detainee. 195 Nevertheless, these
diverse efforts reflect a widely shared understanding of how critically
important it is that people who are subjected to investigation and
detention have access to defense counsel at the earliest stages of the
criminal process.
D. Representation and Judicial Intervention in Chicago
As discussed in Part II, Chicago’s First Defense Legal Aid program is
an example of a visiting counsel program that aims to provide 24/7 early
access. Although the Seventh Circuit aborted FDLA’s efforts to make
that access more meaningful, the organization has had significant
systemic impact. Staff attorneys manage and advise volunteers who
handle the organization’s hotline. 196 Once a person reaches the bond
stage, FDLA provides the case file to the public defender’s office, which
handles the case thereafter. According to FDLA director Eliza Solowiej,
stationhouse counsel reduces costs by exposing holes in cases that are
likely to fall apart later on.197 FDLA supplements representation with
public education and outreach, including billboards and know-yourrights cards proclaiming “silence is power.” 198
After losing the civil rights case in the Seventh Circuit, FDLA began
gathering and presenting evidence about the harm caused by the absence
of stationhouse counsel. Another nonprofit, Chicago Appleseed Fund for
Justice, began presenting position papers and other forms of advocacy on
the issue to state and local officials, with a specific focus on the denial of
public defense counsel for detainees who could post bond. 199 This
194. Interview with Mark Houldin, Office of the Phila. Pub. Def. (Jan. 10, 2018).
195. See HANNAH QUIRK, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 5 (2017).
196. Kate Morrissey, First Defense Legal Aid: Chicago Lawyers Give Free Counsel in Free
Time, MEDILL NEWS, http://www.medillnews847.com/madeinchicago/fdla/index.html (last visited
May 28, 2019).
197. FIRST DEF. LEGAL AID, https://www.first-defense.org/ (last visited May 28, 2019); Steve
Schmadeke, Arrestees to Get Access to Lawyers Free of Charge at Chicago Police Stations, CHI.
TRIB. (Mar. 14, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-freeattorneys-police-custody-met-20170314-story.html.
198. See Morrissey, supra note 196; cf. COBARRUBIAS, “The First 24”, supra note 10.
199. History, CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUST., http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/about-
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information was presented to Chief Judge Timothy Evans, who was
transitioning from his role as the South Side alderman to local judge and,
by the early 2000s, had become the first African American Chief Judge
in Cook County. 200 This judicial circuit is the largest in Illinois, with 400
judges and almost 3000 employees.
Chief Judge Evans issued an administrative order to address the denial
of counsel issue.201 Results were positive, but problems remained.202 In
early 2017, Judge Evans issued another administrative order appointing
the Cook County Public Defender as counsel for people who are detained
at police stations and request counsel, with compliance occurring via inperson, on-site staff attorneys during the day and on-call volunteer
lawyers after hours. 203 The express aim of this Stationhouse
Representation Program was to “help individuals held in Chicago Police
Department custody gain access to a free attorney in the police station”
in order to “ensure that constitutional rights are protected from the earliest
point of contact with the criminal justice system” by providing all
detainees with “the opportunity to speak with an attorney before talking
to anybody else.”204
The program provides service around the clock, seven days a week.
Assistant Public Defenders are on call during business hours, and FDLA
covers the remaining time period. 205 Requests for stationhouse
us/history/ (last visited May 28, 2019); Constitutional Issues, CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUST.,
http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/criminal-justice/constitutional-issues/ (last visited May 28,
2019).
200. For Chief Judge Evans’s information, see Timothy C. Evans, COOK COUNTY GOV’T,
https://www.cookcountyil.gov/person/timothy-c-evans (last visited May 28, 2019).
201. THE COLLABORATION FOR JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ENSURING THE PUBLIC
DEFENSE OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN COOK COUNTY 2 (2015),
http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-Executive-SummaryIndigent-Defense.pdf.
202. THE COLLABORATION FOR JUSTICE, ENSURING THE PUBLIC DEFENSE OF INDIGENT
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN COOK COUNTY 1 (2015), http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/Aug-2015-Indigent-Defense-1.pdf.
203. Order No. 2017-01: Appointment of the Public Defender or Designee for Persons in Police
Custody, Circuit Court of Cook County (Mar. 14, 2017); Kathleen Geier, New Court Policy to
Provide Public Defenders in Police Stations, CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUST. (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://www.chicagoappleseed.org/our-blog/new-court-policy-to-provide-public-defenders-inpolice-stations/; Schmadeke, supra note 197.
204. Press Release, Circuit Court of Cook Cty., Chief Judge Signs Order to Provide Free
Lawyers for Arrestees in CPD Custody (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.cookcountycourt.
org/MEDIA/ViewPressRelease/tabid/338/ArticleId/2540/Chief-Judge-signs-order-to-providefree-lawyers-for-arrestees-in-CPD-custody.aspx.
205. See CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUSTICE, STATION-HOUSE REPRESENTATION IN CHICAGO
AT SIX MONTHS: OUTCOMES, OBSTACLES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2017) [hereinafter
STATION-HOUSE REPRESENTATION]; AMY P. CAMPANELLI, LAW OFFICE OF THE COOK CTY. PUB.
DEF., FY2015–FY2018 BUDGET AND OPERATIONS REPORT 16 [hereinafter BUDGET REPORT].
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representation have increased since the program began. 206 The program
has also been embraced by Cook County State’s Attorney Kimberly
Foxx, who stated that “[t]he legitimacy of the justice system depends on
protecting the constitutional rights of people who come in contact with it.
Today’s announcement affirms the commitment of all the stakeholders in
the justice system to ensuring that no one is denied their constitutional
right to counsel.” 207 Thus, Cook County, Illinois—home of the original
Escobedo litigation—offers an example of the movement to revive
Escobedo’s long-delayed promise.
IV. WHITHER STATIONHOUSE ACCESS TO COUNSEL?
The discussion in Part III invites a thought experiment on optimal
methods for vindicating the right to stationhouse counsel. Assuming the
continuation of carceral systems 208 and police interrogation within those
systems, 209 the most robust model would extend the Dutch ban on
uncounseled waivers to all cases—including misdemeanors, the outsized
impact of which leading scholars rightly decry. 210 Weaker alternatives
would require invocation of the right to counsel. To avoid regressing to
Miranda’s unacceptable mean, however, the mandatory-invocation
model should incorporate two rules discussed above. The first is the
Rankin “indelible rights” rule, which prevents uncounseled waivers as
soon as police learn of counsel’s entry into a case. The second would be
a modified Cook County approach, which would entail automatic
appointment of the local public defense service provider to avoid delay
in counsel’s entry into the case. These modifications would transform the
detainee’s duty to invoke counsel into an opportunity to decline counsel.
To be sure, declinations will occur. However, this model would minimize
police pressure by formally establishing the attorney-client relationship
at the earliest possible juncture and by maximizing opportunities for
declinations to be fully informed and voluntary.
Two major criticisms are predictable. The first involves crime control.
Courts and commentators have long worried that early access to counsel
206. STATION-HOUSE REPRESENTATION, supra note 205, at 3; BUDGET REPORT, supra note
205, at 16 fig. 30.
207. See Press Release, Circuit Court of Cook Cty., supra note 204.
208. See generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN
OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2015) (discussing resilience of the carceral state).
209. See Bernard Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 21 (1961).
210. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE
MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018);
see also Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 142 (discussing negative impacts of pretrial
detention in misdemeanor cases).
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interferes significantly with that goal, although the weight of the literature
does not appear to support that hypothesis.211 The emergence of
stationhouse counsel programs may offer a set of natural experiments that
researchers can exploit to test the crime control hypothesis more
rigorously.
The larger concern is whether there will be any meaningful experiment
to evaluate. Available data indicate that in Cook County, fewer than 2
percent of detainees had access to counsel within three days of detention;
to enhance access, responsive legislation would require that police allow
detainees three free telephone calls within an hour of their detention.212
Yet even if police support speedy access to stationhouse counsel, weak
constitutional regulations leave public defense systems overworked and
underfunded. 213 It is not obvious that already swamped systems can
provide meaningful stationhouse access even in the unlikely event that
more stations open their doors to public defenders. Available data on
early access programs also raise questions about the quality of the
representation provided. 214 Moreover, as predicted by early researchers,
broader access to defense counsel may alter little of the institutionalized
case-processing that characterizes many criminal legal systems, as
counsel are co-opted into the courtroom workgroup. 215
The strongest rebuttal to these objections lies in the lessons to be drawn
from Part I’s historical sketch. As Justice Goldberg noted in Escobedo,
“If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a
system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that

211. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 118 (examining Miranda’s misunderstanding of the
privilege against self-incrimination); Donald A. Dripps, Miranda for the Next Fifty Years: Why the
Fifth Amendment Should Go Fourth, 97 B.U. L. REV. 893, 928–29 (2017).
212. Rachel Hinton, County Officials Back Legislation to Make Sure Arrestees Get Their Phone
Calls, CHI. SUN TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019, I:52 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2019/1/29/
18363621/county-officials-back-legislation-to-make-sure-arrestees-get-their-phone-calls;
H.B.
1616, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?
DocTypeID=HB&DocNum=1616&GAID=15&SessionID=108&LegID=116147 (proposing to
amend Illinois’s Code of Criminal Procedure). See also BLACKSTOCK ET AL., supra note 177, at
304–05 (discussing police strategies to discourage detainees’ exercise of their rights to stationhouse
counsel).
213. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and No
Time, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/publicdefender-case-loads.html (describing case overloads in Lafayette, Louisiana public defense
system).
214. See, e.g., BLACKSTOCK ET AL., supra note 177, at 304–307; QUIRK, supra note 195, at 88.
215. See Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC’Y REV. 15, 39 (1967) (describing the “monstrous appetite
of courts for the cooptation of entire professional groups”).
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system.” 216 “Moving the Constitution into the Police Station” 217 through
stationhouse counsel is a mode of law enforcement and a necessary, if
partial, antidote to risks of police violence and intimidation.
CONCLUSION
This Essay’s reflection on the half-century that has passed since the
Chicago Eight trial has identified opportunities to memorialize other
events. Forty years have passed since the Seventh Circuit reinstated the
civil rights lawsuit filed by survivors of the Chicago police raid that killed
Fred Hampton. 218 Ten years have passed since the Illinois legislature
created the state’s Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission. 219 Five years
ago, protests erupted over the “disappearance” of detainees from a
Chicago police building—to the bemusement of local attorneys, for
whom police interference with client access was business as usual. 220
Many of these events resulted in significant part from judicial failures
to enforce the rights to be free from police violence and to obtain early
access to counsel. Those failures illustrate one aspect of Stuart
Scheingold’s myth of rights theory by showing how rights become false
promises. However, other events discussed in this Essay illustrate the
second aspect of Scheingold’s theory by showing how even weakened
rights can retain sufficient meaning to inspire collective action and legal
change. Will a future symposium celebrate the fifty-year anniversary of
Rankin’s extending the right of stationhouse counsel to poor people?221
Or will efforts to revive Escobedo die aborning? Only time—and the
commitment of activists, lawyers, and judges to equal justice—will tell.

216. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
217. See TIME COVER, supra note 131.
218. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754
(1980).
219. Mission and Procedure Statement, ST. ILL. TORTURE INQUIRY & RELIEF COMMISSION,
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/tirc/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 28, 2019).
220. Heinzmann & Gorner, supra note 156.
221. People v. Rankin, 998 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Cty. Ct. 2014).

